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I. Introduction 
 The federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program provides cash assistance to more than 
7.1 million aged, blind, and disabled persons in the U.S. who are below federally mandated income and 
asset limits.  In terms of total spending it is now second only to Medicaid among means-tested programs 
with more than $38 billion in 2004 expenditures.  The number of individuals receiving SSI benefits has 
grown substantially during the past fifteen years, from 4.59 million in December of 1989 to 7.14 million 
by November of 2005. The increase in SSI receipt over this period has been especially rapid among 
children under the age of 18, with their ranks increasing from 0.26 to 1.04 million. The result of this 
growth, along with an increase in SSI enrollment among adults with children, is that 6 percent of children 
now reside in a household with SSI income. This is more than double the corresponding share in 1990. 
Our main goal in this paper is to investigate the impact of a child's enrollment in SSI on key 
outcome measures such as poverty, parental earnings, and health insurance coverage.  Identification of a 
causal impact of program participation is inherently difficult for at least three reasons.  First, as with other 
means-tested programs, a family's eligibility for the program is determined in part by a family's economic 
circumstance. Cross-sectional comparisons of households with and without SSI benefits would therefore 
potentially be biased by some amount of reverse causation. Furthermore, a child must have a medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment in order to qualify for SSI benefits. Having a child with a 
disability may exert an independent effect on a parent's optimal labor supply or other decisions, making it 
difficult to disentangle the effect of the program from this potentially confounding factor. And finally, 
SSI is a federal program that exhibits almost no variation across states or other geographic areas.  Thus 
whereas previous research has exploited cross-state variation in benefit amounts and eligibility criteria to 
identify the effect of other means-tested programs such as AFDC, Medicaid, and food stamps, such an 
empirical strategy is unlikely to succeed in this context. 1   
                                                 
1 Some states do supplement the federal SSI benefit.  But these supplements are quite small for children and 
accounted for just 3 percent of all SSI benefits paid during the 2005 calendar year.  The corresponding share for 
adults was 13 percent, and thus the supplements are a more useful source of variation in program incentives for this 
group.  See Neumark and Powers (1998, 2000) for analyses that exploit the cross-state heterogeneity in state 
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To surmount these obstacles to identification, we exploit longitudinal data from the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) that enables us to observe household outcomes in the months 
leading up to and immediately following a child's first enrollment in the SSI program.  This strategy 
allows us to control for unobserved, time-invariant differences across households that might bias cross-
sectional estimates.  The key identifying assumption of this approach is that the precise timing of the 
award of SSI benefits to the child is not correlated with other changes that influence the household 
outcome being studied. Note that this strategy would not be appropriate for studying the causal effect of 
most other government expenditure programs, such as unemployment insurance, TANF, or social 
security, as enrollment in those programs would often be precipitated by a discrete change in the 
employment status or health of adults in the household. 
But in the case of child SSI enrollment, this strategy seems appropriate for two reasons.  First, the 
vast majority of children awarded SSI benefits have a chronic rather than an acute condition.2  Thus it is 
not the case that most children apply for the program after a discrete change in health status, which might 
itself influence parental labor supply or other outcome variables of interest.  Instead, children are likely to 
apply after learning about the program from a welfare caseworker, a physician, an advocacy group, or a 
school counselor (Bound et al, 1998; Garrett and Glied, 2000; Kubik, 1999).  Second, there is typically a 
substantial lag between the initial application for SSI benefits and the eventual award (if one is made), 
with this lag averaging 4.3 months for awardees under the age of 18.3  This lag occurs both because the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) must determine a child's eligibility for the program and because the 
state Disability Determination Service (DDS) must decide whether the child has a "medically 
                                                                                                                                                             
supplements for adult SSI recipients to identify the impact of the program on the labor supply and savings of near 
elderly individuals. 
2 For example, in 2003 approximately 67 percent of children awarded SSI benefits had a mental disorder as their 
primary diagnosis and fewer than two percent qualified because of an injury or a disease of the circulatory system.  
3 The length of the time lag will depend both on the SSA and on the state DDS.  As described on the SSA website, 
after a child disability report is formally submitted to SSA, “We review it to make sure all of the information is 
complete. We may contact you for missing or unclear information; We will contact you to complete a formal 
application for benefits, if you haven't already done one; We send the child's forms to the State office that 
determines if the child is disabled under Social Security law; The State office requests medical records from the 
hospitals, doctors, and other treatment sources and information from the child's teachers, schools, and other people 
whom you listed as having information about the child's illnesses, injuries or conditions; The State office then 
reviews all the information it obtains." 
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determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments that causes marked and 
severe functional limitations" (SSA, 1998). 
One potential concern with this approach is that a family might apply for child SSI benefits 
because of a change in circumstances.  For example, a parent might apply for the program after losing his 
or her job or in response to a decline in the child's health.  Failing to account for this could lead to a 
biased estimate of the impact of SSI enrollment.  But because of the longitudinal nature of our data, we 
can investigate whether there are changes in outcome variables of interest such as earnings, poverty 
status, and health insurance coverage in the months leading up to the first receipt of SSI benefits and thus 
avoid erroneously assigning a causal interpretation to any observed change in outcomes.4 
Previous work on child SSI participation has documented the shifting of children from the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program to the SSI program during the 1990s (Kubik 1999, 
2003; Garrett and Glied, 2000; Schmidt and Sevak, 2004). The only paper of which we are aware that 
investigates the relationship between child SSI participation and individual-level outcomes other than 
program participation is Kubik (1999). Kubik exploits the variation across states in the potential financial 
gain to a family from moving a child from AFDC to SSI. Using data from the National Health Interview 
Survey (NHIS), he documents that in the four years following the 1990 liberalization, female-headed 
households in states with higher potential SSI gains were more likely to identify that their child suffered 
from a health impairment (in particular a mental health impairment), to take their child to a doctor, and to 
report that their child needs special education.5 
This paper builds on the previous literature by asking how enrollment of a child in SSI affects 
household-level economic outcomes. We begin our empirical analysis with an investigation of the 
                                                 
4 An alternative approach would be to instrument for SSI benefit receipt with the level of state supplementation of 
the federal SSI benefit. Neumark and Powers (1998, 2000) implement such a strategy in their studies of the effect of 
SSI participation on pre-retirement savings and labor supply among the near elderly. However, as noted above, this 
is not as appropriate in the context of child SSI participation because state SSI supplements for children are very 
small and vary little over time. The authors’ attempts at such an IV approach produced estimates that were very 
imprecisely estimated. 
5 Using data from the March CPS, Kubik also finds that a family's receipt of SSI benefits has a negative effect on the 
probability that the head of the family works. But as he points out, it is not possible to separately identify the effect 
of child and adult SSI participation, which is potentially problematic as we discuss below.  
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demographic and institutional determinants of SSI child participation using data for all households with 
children from the 1992, 1993, 1996, and 2001 SIPP surveys. This presents a picture of what types of 
households are enrolling children in the SSI program and how they differ from other households without 
a child on the program.  
 The remainder of the paper focuses on the estimation of the impact of child SSI enrollment on a 
number of household outcomes. Our first set of findings demonstrates that the enrollment of a child on 
SSI leads to an increase in total household unearned income of $1,650 defined over a four-month period, 
compared to an increase in total SSI income of $1,747. (Outcomes are defined in the SIPP over a survey 
“wave”, which constitutes a four-month period.) These estimates imply that the increase in SSI income 
greatly exceeds any offsetting reduction in transfer income from other programs such as TANF and food 
stamps. Looking at household earnings, we find no statistically significant changes in the level of 
earnings, the probability of positive household earnings, or log earnings conditional on positive earnings. 
However, the pattern of coefficients and the results for alternate estimation samples, suggests that there 
might be some decrease in conditional earnings on the order of 5 to 10 percent. Total household income 
increases by an average of approximately 22 percent after a child enrolls in SSI.   
Our next set of findings demonstrates that the enrollment of a child on SSI leads to a statistically 
significant, substantial, and persistent reduction in the probability that a household lives in poverty. We 
find a statistically significant reduction of 10.8 percentage points in the probability that a household is in 
poverty following enrollment of a child in SSI.  This stems in large part from an effect on deep poverty, 
which we define to be less than 50 percent of the poverty line. Because the typical child receiving SSI has 
one or more siblings, our estimates suggest an even larger effect on the number of children in poverty. 
The observed increase in family income need not have implied a reduction in poverty rates for two 
reasons. First, although SSI is a means-tested program, a child can still qualify for the program even if 
his/her family income is substantially above the poverty line. For example, a family with one parent and 
two children could have earnings of more than $30,000 per year and yet still receive SSI benefits. Second, 
it is an empirical question as to whether the increase in transfer income associated with SSI participation, 
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net of any offsetting decrease in earned or other income, is sufficient to lift a family out of poverty.  
Our final set of estimates focuses on the impact of SSI participation on the health insurance 
coverage of children. Because SSI recipients are immediately eligible for health insurance through the 
Medicaid program in most states, it is plausible that child SSI enrollment leads to an increase in health 
insurance coverage among children. We find little evidence to support this conjecture. While Medicaid 
coverage does increase substantially among children following SSI enrollment, most of the children who 
were not already on Medicaid had private health insurance just prior to enrollment in SSI. Taken together, 
our results suggest that the growth of SSI enrollment has substantially lowered poverty rates among 
affected children but that it has had little impact on labor supply or health insurance coverage. 
 
II. Background  
A. The Growth in SSI Enrollment among Children  
The first cash payments from the Supplemental Security Income program were disbursed in 
January of 1974, when 51 state-level programs that had assisted low-income aged, blind, and disabled 
adults were consolidated into one federal program.6 In its first year, more than 60 percent of the 4.0 
million SSI recipients were above the age of 65 and less than two percent were under the age of 18. Thirty 
years later in November of 2005, there were approximately 2.0 million elderly adults, 4.1 million aged 18 
to 64, and more than 1.0 million children receiving SSI benefits. The growth in SSI enrollment has made 
it much more important as a source of cash assistance for low-income families with children. In 1989 
there were 15.7 times more families on AFDC than with a child on SSI.7  But by 2004 that ratio had fallen 
to just 2.2.  As we demonstrate below, if one accounts for adult SSI enrollment, then the receipt of SSI 
benefits is now more common than TANF receipt among households with children. 
Much of the increase in child SSI participation was precipitated by the February 1990 Supreme 
                                                 
6 See Daly and Burkhauser (2003) for more details on the SSI program, its history, and a review of the SSI literature. 
7 According to tabulations performed by Paul Davies at the Social Security Administration at the request of the 
authors, approximately 19% of child SSI recipients have a sibling on the program.  We multiply the number of 
children on SSI by (0.81 + (0.19 / 2)) to approximate the number of families with one or more children on SSI. 
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Court decision in Sullivan v. Zebley, which had the effect of liberalizing the medical eligibility criteria for 
children to qualify for SSI. In the seven years following that decision, the number of children on SSI 
increased by 260 percent to more than 955,000.  This represented an increase from 0.4 to 1.4 percent of 
all children between the ages of 0 and 17.8  This period of rapid growth represented a sharp break in the 
slight upward trend prior to Zebley: during the four years from 1985 to 1989 the number of children on 
SSI increased by only 37,500.  Figure 1 plots the percentage of children on SSI from 1985 to 2005 and 
Figure 2 plots the percentage of children applying for or awarded SSI through 2004.  As revealed by this 
latter figure, there was a noticeable increase in applications and awards after the Zebley ruling, with these 
two series peaking in 1994 and 1993, respectively. 
Previous research has demonstrated that in the years following this liberalization of the medical 
eligibility criteria for SSI enrollment by children, there was substantial shifting of children from the 
AFDC program to the SSI program. In states where the child SSI benefit exceeded the marginal AFDC 
benefit associated with that child, a family receiving AFDC income had an incentive to move an eligible 
child from AFDC to SSI, as a child could not legally receive benefits from both programs. Furthermore, 
as AFDC was jointly funded by states and the federal government and SSI is federally funded (though 
some states choose to supplement state benefits) it was also in the states’ financial interest to move 
eligible children from AFDC to SSI. Kubik (1999, 2003) and Garrett and Glied (2000) provide evidence 
that both individuals and states responded to these incentives and that substantial shifting occurred. 
Schmidt and Sevak (2004) provide evidence that female-headed households in states aggressively 
pursuing welfare reform in more recent years were more likely to have SSI income.  
The growth in SSI receipt after the Zebley decision was driven primarily by an increase in the 
number of children qualifying for the program because of a mental disorder.  Press accounts and 
anecdotes of children being “coached” to display behavioral disorders in order to be determined medically 
eligible for SSI led to a concern that the disability standard for children had become too lenient. Perhaps 
partly in response to this concern, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
                                                 
8 The fraction of children affected was even higher given that the average child SSI recipient has 1.4 siblings. 
 8
Act (PRWORA) legislation required SSA to use a stricter standard of disability for child SSI applicants 
and to reevaluate the eligibility status of almost one-third of recipients (Kubik, 1999).9  This put an end to 
the rapid growth in child SSI participation. Nearly 100,000 children were terminated from the rolls in 
1997 (with most deemed "no longer disabled") because of this legislation and the number on SSI 
remained roughly constant during the subsequent three years.  Notably, SSI receipt among children 
started to increase again in 2000, growing by more than 4 percent per year through November of 2005.  
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the fraction of children now receiving SSI is greater than it was before the 
1997 tightening induced by PRWORA. 
B. SSI Program Parameters and Rules 
Eligibility requirements and federal payment standards for SSI are uniform nationwide, though 
states have the option to supplement the federal SSI payment.  To be medically eligible for SSI, a child 
must have a medically determinable impairment and the impairment(s) must be severe. A severe 
impairment is defined by the SSA as one that is more than a slight abnormality or a combination of slight 
abnormalities that causes more than minimal functional limitations. The SSA process determines an 
impairment(s) to cause "marked and severe functional limitations if it meets or medically equals the 
severity of a set of criteria for an impairment in the [SSA] listings, or if it functionally equals the listings.” 
Furthermore, this impairment(s) must be expected to last for at least 12 months or result in death. This 
medical determination is made by state Disability Determination Services offices.10 
In 2005 the maximum federal SSI payment was $579 monthly for an individual and in June of 
that year the average child SSI benefit was $517.  This number reflects an average federal payment of 
$502. Though fifteen states supplement child SSI benefits, these supplements account for just three 
                                                 
9 The 1996 legislation created a separate definition of disability for children, thus eliminating the requirement that 
the child standard be of comparable severity to the adult standard. The law also eliminated references to maladaptive 
behaviors in the Listing of Impairments for children and discontinued the use of individualized functional 
assessments for children.  PRWORA also made the eligibility criteria for legal immigrants and struck alcoholism 
and drug addiction from the list of diagnoses with which individuals could qualify for SSI.  See Karoly, Klerman, 
and Rogowski (2004) for a more detailed discussion of PRWORA's effects on the SSI program.  
10 In future work we hope to exploit variation across states and/or offices in the likelihood of a medical 
determination conditional upon application, but have not yet been able to obtain the necessary data. 
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percent of total SSI spending for children. Since 1975, the maximum federal SSI benefit has increased 
with the CPI each year to account for increases in the cost of living.  
Adults are generally not eligible for SSI if they have assets in excess of $2,000. Certain resources 
are excluded, most commonly a home, an automobile, household goods, and life insurance. For eligible 
adults, the federal SSI payment is based on the individual’s countable income. The first $20 of unearned 
or earned monthly income is excluded, as is the first $65 of monthly earnings plus one-half of any 
earnings above $65. In the case of a child SSI recipient, some of the income and assets of certain family 
members living in the same household are “deemed” to the recipient. Payments from AFDC/TANF to 
other household members are excluded from deeming, as are foster care payments, food stamps, and 
EITC benefits to anyone in the household. Household income that is used by another public assistance 
program to determine the payment amount to someone other than the SSI recipient is also excluded from 
deeming. There is also an allowance for each ineligible child as well as a parental living exclusion.  
In the 2005 calendar year an eligible child in a one-parent family would receive the maximum 
SSI benefit with parental monthly earnings up to $1,243 if there were no other children in the household, 
$1,533 if there was one other child, and $1,823 if two other children in the household.11 These numbers 
illustrate that parents of children on SSI can have relatively high levels of earnings while still collecting 
the maximum SSI benefit for their child.  The phase-out rate of benefits is 50 percent and thus a parent 
with two children (one of whom is on SSI) could earn up to $2,691 per month ($32,292 per year) before 
SSI benefits would reach zero.  If instead the parent was the one on SSI, benefits would begin to phase 
out once the recipient's monthly earnings exceeded $85.  Thus labor supply incentives are quite different 
if a child rather than an adult is on SSI. 
 
                                                 
11 As an example, consider a family in 2005 with two children and one parent that had only two sources of family 
income: an SSI payment to one child and $1500 in monthly earnings. The SSA first deducts $290 for the other 
child’s monthly allowance, $20 for the general income exclusion, and $65 for the earnings exclusion. One-half of 
the remaining $1125 in earnings is excluded, bringing deemed income to $562.50. The parental living allowance of 
$579 would then be subtracted, leaving zero income deemed to the child and thus he would qualify for the 
maximum benefit. If instead the family consisted only of the parent and eligible child, there would be no monthly 
allowance for another child. Thus $128.50 would be deemed, resulting in an SSI payment of $450.50. 
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III. Evidence from the SIPP on SSI benefit receipt 
A. The Growing Importance of SSI Relative to Welfare 
In this section we present information on household receipt of SSI and AFDC/TANF income 
based on data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP is the primary 
source of publicly available data on participation in government expenditure programs12 and is the only 
source of data that reliably distinguishes between child and adult SSI receipt.13  This is especially 
important for our analysis because the effect of the program on labor supply incentives is very different if 
a child rather than an adult is enrolled. The first SIPP survey was conducted in 1984 and additional 
surveys were launched in each year until 1993.  More recent SIPP surveys have been conducted in 1996, 
2001, and 2004.14  In every survey, households were interviewed three times a year and each wave of the 
survey collected information about the previous four months.  In a typical survey approximately 38 
percent of households had one or more children under the age of 18 in the first wave.  
In Table 1 we summarize data on SSI and AFDC/TANF benefit receipt for all households with at 
least one child under the age of eighteen from the first wave of the 1990, 1993, 1996, 2001, and 2004 
SIPP surveys. In all of our analyses we focus on households rather than families because of the likelihood 
that economic resources of one family in the household will to some extent spill over to the other.  This 
data paints a stark picture of how the delivery of cash assistance to low-income families with children has 
changed over the past 15 years. As shown in the table, between 1990 and 1996, the percent of children in 
households with welfare income climbed on net from 10.3 to 11.4 percent, while the percent with SSI 
income climbed from 2.8 percent to 5.1 percent. By 2004, the percent of children in households with SSI 
                                                 
12 One reason why the SIPP is considered to be the most reliable source of individual-level data on participation in 
government expenditure programs is that the survey is conducted three times per year and thus individuals need only 
recall their program participation during the preceding four months (Ham and Shore-Shepard, 2005). 
13 Starting in 2001, Current Population Survey (CPS) data began recording whether SSI income received by a 
respondent was on behalf of a disabled or blind child. However, authors’ tabulations of this data imply that the CPS 
substantially understates the fraction of SSI recipients who are children. 
14 The first ten surveys each followed a nationally representative sample of approximately 20,000 households for 
three years, or nine four-month “waves”. Thus during the period from 1984 to 1993 there were typically three 
surveys ongoing at any time.  The 1996 survey followed a sample of 36,730 households for four years (12 waves) 
and the 2001 survey followed a sample of 35,106 households for three years (9 waves).  As with most longitudinal 
surveys there is some attrition in the SIPP, though the Census adjusts person and household weights in each wave to 
account for differential attrition by observable characteristics.  
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income reached 6.0 percent, while the number in households with welfare income fell by more than half 
to 4.9 percent. It thus appears to be true that there are now more children living in households with SSI 
income than living in households with TANF income. These data also suggest that the recent growth in 
SSI has to some extent offset the dramatic decrease in welfare caseloads. 
Table 1 also shows that in 1990, average AFDC benefits among AFDC families were 10 percent 
greater than average SSI benefits among SSI families ($2,127 compared to $1,939 during the four month 
period).15 By 2004, the reverse was true, with average SSI benefits approximately twice as large as TANF 
benefits among recipient households ($2,342 versus $1,178).  This change was largely driven by the fact 
that SSI benefit amounts are inflation-adjusted whereas welfare benefits are not. Thus both because of the 
more generous benefits and because of the greater fraction of households enrolled, SSI has become a 
much larger source of cash assistance than TANF for households with children. 
B. The Demographic Determinants of Household SSI Receipt 
 In this section we explore which observable household characteristics are related with program 
participation. We estimate probit models predicting receipt of child SSI benefits, and for the sake of 
comparison, adult SSI benefits and welfare (AFDC or TANF) benefits. Our sample consists of the 42,170 
households with a child under the age 18 in the first wave of the pooled 1992, 1993, 1996, and 2001 SIPP 
surveys. We begin with the 1992 version of the SIPP because it is the first survey year to differentiate 
between child and adult SSI receipt.16  The public-use 2004 survey data does not include state identifiers 
so we do not include that data in our analyses. In this pooled sample, the percentage of households with a 
child receiving SSI benefits in one or more months is 1.6 percent; the percent receiving adult SSI is 2.6 
percent, and the percent receiving welfare (AFDC or TANF) is 8.5 percent.   
Our regression model is specified as follows, with j, k, and t indexing households, states, and 
                                                 
15 Dollar values cited here and elsewhere in the paper are inflation adjusted to 2003 dollars using the Consumer 
Price Index for all urban consumers (CPI-U). 
16 For children under the age of 15 who are receiving SSI benefits the income will be reported as SSI child income 
for an adult in the household (the unit of observation in the SIPP is a person-month).  Thus if there are multiple 
children in the household under age 15 it is not possible to determine which one is receiving SSI.  For children who 
are 15-17 years old, SSI benefits will either be reported as child SSI income for an adult in the household or as adult 
SSI income for the child. 
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years, respectively: 
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The variable Kidsjkt controls for the number of children in the household between the ages of 0 and 17. 
All else equal this should be positively related with the probability of having a child on SSI.  The variable 
Boysjkt is separately included because boys are much more likely than girls to receive child SSI benefits.17 
as they are substantially more likely to have mental and behavioral disorders.  The model also controls for 
the presence of one or more parents in the household, the education level of the more educated parent (or 
guardian if no parent is present), and the race and ethnicity of the children. The variable GenAFDCjkt is 
intended to capture the effect of the benefit generosity of the state’s welfare program. It is defined as the 
maximum AFDC or TANF benefit in state k in year t given the size of family j.18 The variable SSISuppkt 
is an indicator that equals one if state k supplemented child SSI benefits in year t and zero otherwise.19  
The model also includes indicator variables for year to control for any time effects shared across 
households.  
 Column (1) in Table 2 reports the mean values of all the explanatory variables included in the 
regression model. Column (2) reports the estimated marginal effects of these variables on the likelihood 
of child SSI benefits in the household. The results summarized in column (2) indicate that the likelihood 
of child SSI benefits is significantly positively related with the number of children in a household and 
increases in the number of boys in the household. This is not surprising as boys constitute a larger share 
of the overall SSI child caseload, in particular owing to the greater documented prevalence of mental 
disorders among boys. The estimated positive coefficients on MomOnly, DadOnly, and Neither imply that 
children living in a household with two parents are significantly less likely to receive SSI than their 
                                                 
17 There is substantial evidence from the fields of child and clinical psychology that boys are more likely than girls 
to experience mental disorders. 
18 We approximate this as the number of children plus the number of parents in the household. 
19 The AFDC/TANF and SSI supplement data were obtained from various years of the publications Overview of 
Entitlement Programs and State Assistance Programs for SSI Recipients, respectively. 
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counterparts in families headed by one parent or by a guardian that is not the parent. The estimated 
marginal effects also imply that children with less educated parents are statistically significantly more 
likely to receive SSI benefits, controlling for other demographic characteristics. 
 Interestingly, the generosity of welfare benefits in a household’s state of residence is a 
statistically significant negative determinant of whether the household receives child SSI benefits. This 
corroborates the findings of Garrett and Glied (2000) and Kubik (1999), discussed above. The data also 
indicate that a child is more likely to receive SSI when living in a state that supplements the federal 
benefit.20  The estimated marginal effects on Black and Hispanic imply that conditional on other 
household characteristics, black children are significantly more likely to receive SSI benefits than white 
children, but Hispanic children are not. And finally, the estimates for the coefficients on the three year 
indicator variables (1992 is omitted) confirm a significant increase in child SSI receipt over time.  
For the sake of comparison and contrast, columns (3) and (4) present analogous estimates for 
adult SSI receipt and AFDC/TANF receipt among households with children. For the receipt of adult SSI 
benefits, neither the number of children nor the number of boys is significantly related to program 
participation. The financial generosity of the state’s AFDC/TANF program is also not significantly 
related with adult SSI receipt. These findings, which contrast with the results from the first specification, 
suggest that the corresponding estimates for child SSI enrollment are not simply capturing the influence 
of omitted characteristics of residents of a state that influence SSI receipt generally rather than child 
enrollment specifically. They also serve to bolster our confidence that the SIPP is accurately recording 
whether household SSI benefits are due to child or adult program participation. The coefficient estimates 
for family structure, education of the parent, race and ethnicity of the children, and year effects are 
qualitatively similar to those for child SSI receipt. 
The results presented in the final column show that household structure, parental education, and 
the race and ethnicity of the children have a similar relationship with the likelihood of AFDC/TANF 
                                                 
20 Specifying this variable with the dollar amount of supplementation instead of an indicator variable for 
supplementation also yields positive point estimates, though these are not statistically significant. 
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receipt as they do with child SSI receipt. But three differences with the child SSI results are worth noting.  
First, whereas the number of children is significantly positively related with AFDC/TANF receipt, the 
relationship is not significantly stronger for households with relatively many boys. Second, while child 
SSI receipt is negatively determined by AFDC/TANF generosity, the opposite is true for welfare receipt. 
And finally, the estimates for the year indicators demonstrate that AFDC/TANF receipt fell from the first 
to the final survey year while the opposite is true for SSI.  These results suggest that while many family 
characteristics similarly determine SSI and welfare receipt, there are some important differences as well. 
 
IV. Estimating the Causal Effect of Child SSI Receipt on Household Outcomes 
We now turn our attention to estimating the impact of child SSI participation on household 
outcomes, including earned income, total income, poverty status, and health insurance coverage. Our 
empirical strategy is to exploit the longitudinal nature of the SIPP to determine whether there is a break in 
household outcomes corresponding to the period in which the household first receives child SSI benefits. 
For this analysis we use longitudinal data from the 12 waves (48 months) of the 1996 SIPP and the 9 
waves (36 months) of the 2001 SIPP. Each of the 1996 and 2001 surveys contains a sample of more than 
35,000 households. In the pooled data from 1996 and 2001, there are 20,949 households with one or more 
children under the age of fifteen in wave one and who are still present in wave two of the survey.21  Of 
these, 998 report the receipt of child SSI benefits in one or more waves.22 It is important to note that by 
examining data from 1996 and 2001, we are focusing on a period that follows the rapid growth in child 
SSI participation from 1989 to 1996.  It also means that we are examining data from the post-welfare 
reform period. 
A. Mean Outcomes for Households with Children 
                                                 
21 After the first wave individuals may separate from the initial households to form new households though for the 
purposes of our analysis we combine information in each wave for all individuals in the same wave one household.  
If an individual joins the SIPP in a subsequent wave (e.g. because of marriage) then this individual is attached to the 
same wave one sample unit as others in his/her current household. 
22 Though there is a variable in the 1992 and 1993 SIPP surveys indicating whether a child and/or an adult is 
enrolled in SSI, this variable is almost always missing after the first wave. These earlier years of survey data are thus 
not reliable sources of data for our empirical strategy. 
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Table 3 provides summary statistics for households with children with benefits from child SSI, 
adult SSI, or AFDC/TANF in the first wave of the 1996 and 2001 surveys.  With respect to our outcome 
variables of interest, there are substantial differences between households with a child on SSI and those 
receiving some AFDC/TANF income. These differences are noteworthy because these two means-tested 
programs serve fairly similar populations. Households with children and with an adult on SSI are quite 
different from these two groups, with approximately 20% fewer children on average and 40% more 
adults.  Of course, differences in average outcomes are not sufficient to shed light on the causal effect of 
either program; they merely help to motivate the regression analyses that follow. 
Children in households with child SSI income are less likely than those on AFDC to live in 
poverty, with this difference especially pronounced for deep poverty, which we define to be less than 50 
percent of the poverty line. While 34 percent of households with children on AFDC were in deep poverty, 
just 6 percent of families with a child on SSI were. These lower poverty rates are to some extent driven by 
the much higher average earnings among households with a child on SSI though also by the more 
generous benefits. In 1996, average earnings were $1,028 greater ($4,735 versus $3,707) during the four-
month period in households with a child on SSI than in households with some AFDC income. These 
differences could be partially attributable to differences in labor supply incentives given that the incentive 
for a parent to work was much greater if his/her child was on SSI than if the family was on AFDC.23  The 
differences in average earnings were even larger in 2001. This was true even though TANF incorporates 
work requirements and more generous earnings disregards than AFDC. This suggests that at least part of 
the difference in earnings may be mechanical or driven by differences in the characteristics of recipients 
of the two programs.24 
                                                 
23 For example, a single parent with one child could have earned more than $1000 per month before the child's SSI 
benefits would decline.  The tax rate on benefits in the phase-out region would be 50 percent.  In most states the 
earnings disregard for AFDC would have been much lower and the effective tax rate on earnings much higher.  See, 
for example, the case of Pennsylvania summarized in Table 7-3 of the 1998 Overview of Entitlement Programs.   
24 There are of course many other possible explanations for these differences.  For example, given the sharp decline 
in AFDC/TANF receipt the average characteristics of those receiving welfare benefits may have changed 
substantially during this five year period.  Additionally a much smaller fraction of households with a child on SSI 
are also receiving traditional welfare benefits.  This may partially explain the increase in earnings for this group. 
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A third notable difference between the two groups is that the fraction of households with food 
stamp benefits is substantially greater among welfare households than households with child SSI benefits- 
88.4 versus 47.1 percent in 1996 and 82.4 versus 31.0 percent in 2001. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that SSI benefits may to some extent crowd out other transfer income. In terms of health 
insurance coverage, children in households with child SSI income and AFDC income look very similar in 
1996. The percent of children with Medicaid coverage is 87.1 percent and 87.8 percent, respectively; the 
percent with any health insurance coverage is 94.2 percent and 93.0 percent.  This is much greater than 
the rate of health insurance coverage among all children in the U.S., with approximately 14 percent 
reporting that they were without health insurance in the first wave of both surveys.  This potentially 
suggests that participation in either program is an effective means at increasing health insurance coverage 
among children. The 2001 data suggest larger differences, with the percent of SSI children with Medicaid 
having fallen to 68.6 percent. One conjecture as to why this is the case is that fewer households with child 
SSI income also receive welfare income in 2001, as compared to 1996, and it was the link to the welfare 
system that may have kept the family enrolled in Medicaid.25 
The differences summarized here suggest that the enrollment of a child on the SSI program may 
have a substantial effect on household outcomes such as earned income, total income, poverty, and health 
insurance coverage. However, given that families with higher incomes can be eligible for SSI, it is not 
obvious how much of these differences are mechanical (i.e., a reflection of program rules) or simply the 
result of other differences between the two groups. For example Powers (2003) finds that children’s 
health (which will be correlated with child SSI receipt) exerts an important effect on parental labor supply 
decisions, especially for female-headed households.  This motivates the empirical analyses that follow.   
B. Empirical Specification 
As discussed above, cross-sectional comparisons of households with and without child SSI 
benefits would almost certainly confound any effects on household outcomes due to program 
                                                 
25 An alternative explanation is that some households enrolled in private Medicaid managed care plans may report 
private health insurance rather than Medicaid in the survey, as Medicaid managed care grew substantially in the U.S. 
from 1996 to 2001 (Duggan, 2004). 
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participation with selection effects and/or the independent effect of having a disabled child in the 
household. To overcome this identification problem, we exploit the longitudinal nature of the SIPP to 
explore whether the enrollment of a child on SSI leads to a discernable shift in family outcomes. We are 
able to control for household fixed effects in our empirical model to capture any time-invariant 
differences across households in the sample.26   
To attribute a causal interpretation to any observed change in outcomes, even with the inclusion 
of household fixed effects, it must be the case that other factors that influence the outcome variable Y are 
not changing at precisely the same time that the child enrolls in SSI.  Though such an assumption would 
not be appropriate for an examination of the effects of many other transfer programs, it seems defensible 
in the present setting for two reasons. First, the overwhelming majority of children enrolled in SSI have a 
chronic rather than an acute condition. It is therefore unlikely that the severity of the child’s illness – 
which could have an independent effect on household outcomes - would change discontinuously at 
precisely the time that the award is made. Second, it seems unlikely that parents would alter their labor 
supply in anticipation of SSI benefits as the majority of applications are denied and even in those cases 
when an application is accepted, there is a substantial lag between initial application and receipt of 
benefits. 27 Fortunately, we need not rely on these assumptions holding absolutely. An important 
advantage of the SIPP data is that we can actually observe whether household outcomes change 
noticeably in the months leading up to SSI benefit receipt compared to earlier periods.  
Our two main estimation equations are specified as follows: 
[2] jttjjtjt SSIPOSTIY ερμββ +++++= jtΓX)_(10  
                                                 
26 This strategy is similar to the approach taken by Currie and Thomas (1995) in their study of health insurance 
effects using longitudinal data from the National Longitudinal Survey.  An alternative strategy that we have 
explored is using the generosity of AFDC/TANF benefits in the state or the presence of a state SSI supplement to 
instrument for child SSI enrollment.  Unfortunately given the relatively low fraction of children on SSI, the limited 
effect of both variables on SSI enrollment, and the number of households in the SIPP, we do not have sufficient 
statistical power to use this strategy for estimating the effect of child SSI. 
27 We might be concerned about an “Ashenfelter dip” driving selection into the program – if parents apply to enroll 
their child on SSI when they experience a negative shock in economic circumstances, we might observe a bounce 
back of their economic situation when the child finally begins to receive benefits. This might lead us to erroneously 
attribute to child SSI participation. Comparing household outcomes in the months leading up to SSI benefit receipt 
to outcomes in earlier months will help determine if this type of phenomenon is driving any of our results. 
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in which j indexes households and t indexes waves.28 We begin by estimating these equations for all 
20,949 households from the pooled 1996 and 2001 SIPP surveys with one or more children between the 
ages of 0 and 14 in wave one and that are still present in the second survey wave. We test the robustness 
of our findings by estimating the equations on alternative analysis samples, for example by including only 
households that ever enroll a child on SSI or only on households that report having a disabled child.  
If our identifying assumptions hold, then the estimated coefficient on POST_SSI in equation (2) 
will capture the average effect of SSI enrollment on the outcome variable of interest for those households 
that enroll a child in SSI.  Estimation of equation (3) enables us to observe trends in the dependent 
variable in both the pre and post SSI enrollment period.  The variables PRE_MONTHS_1-4 and 
PRE_MONTHS_5-8 are set equal to one in the wave immediately before and two waves before the first 
wave of child SSI enrollment, respectively. The variable FIRST_SSI  is equal to one in the first wave of 
child SSI benefit receipt and zero otherwise; POST_MONTHS_1-4 is an indicator variable for the wave 
immediately following the first wave with child SSI enrollment; and POST_MONTHS_5-8+  equals one 
in all subsequent waves. This variable remains equal to one even if the child exits the program. 
The model controls for household fixed effects jμ  to difference out unobserved, time-invariant 
differences across households. An important household characteristic that is changing over time, and 
hence not controlled for with household fixed effects, is the age composition of children. We thus include 
a vector jtX  of the number of individuals in five different age ranges (0-5, 6-11, 12-14, 15-17, and 18 
plus years).  The regression model also includes indicator variables for 21 waves – twelve for the 1996 
                                                 
28 We define a household based on wave one household, so if a household were to split in a later wave, the data for 
all splintered households would be aggregated to the original household in all subsequent waves.  We use waves 
rather than months as our time period because of the well-documented “seam bias” in the SIPP.  This term is used to 
describe the much higher rate of employment, insurance, and other transitions between waves than within waves.  
Because of this it is not clear that month-to-month variation is as reliable as wave-to-wave variation.  
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survey and nine for the 2001 survey. These are included to capture any changes over time in the outcomes 
variable of interest that are common across households and unrelated with SSI enrollment. 
It is important to emphasize that this empirical strategy identifies the average effect of child SSI 
enrollment only for those households that enroll a child in the program. This may differ substantially from 
the corresponding effect for households with children not on SSI, either those who applied and were 
rejected or those who never applied. In particular, the fact that these households have disabled children 
suggests that their response to program benefits or incentives may be quite different from the response 
that would be found were SSI to be expanded to households with healthier children. Our estimated effects 
in the analyses that follow should therefore be interpreted as the average effect for households with a 
child on SSI.  This effect is commonly referred to in the program evaluation literature as the average 
effect of treatment on the treated (Heckman et al, 2001). 
 
V. The Effect of Child SSI Participation on Household Outcomes 
A. Unearned Income 
We begin our investigation of the effect of child SSI enrollment by estimating the average change 
in transfer income in households that enroll a child in SSI. Table 4 presents the results from Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) estimation of equations (2) and (3). The first two panels report results for Yjt defined 
as total SSI benefits, which is the sum of child and adult benefits received by household members. The 
latter definition allows us to consider that some children on SSI will reach the age of 18 during our study 
period or that some households may not correctly identify their SSI income as child versus adult income 
in every wave. The estimated coefficient on POST_SSI implies a statistically significant increase in total 
SSI income of $1,747 per wave (standard error of 91), or $436 per month. The coefficients on the 
variables PRE_MONTHS_1-4 and FIRST_SSI indicate a sharp increase of $2,088 a wave, or $522 per 
month, in the wave of enrollment. The estimated coefficients on the FIRST_SSI and two POST variables 
show a downward trend, presumably reflecting attrition from the program and perhaps some increase in 
underreporting over time. 
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The results presented in the next four panels demonstrate to what extent this substantial increase 
in SSI transfer income leads to a decrease in other forms of transfer income. In the final columns of the 
table we present the estimated impact on total unearned income. We begin by looking for changes in 
AFDC/TANF income that correspond to the time of enrollment of a child on SSI. Recall that an 
individual cannot legally receive benefits from both programs. Hence, if a child in a family on welfare 
enrolled in SSI, the family’s AFDC/TANF benefit should fall as a result. The estimated impacts are 
indeed negative, though not nearly as large in magnitude as the increase in SSI income. The estimated 
coefficient on the POST_MONTHS_5-8+ indicator, which is perhaps the most reliable indicator of the 
long-term adjustment of program participation, is the most negative: a $241 decrease per wave (standard 
error of 73), or $60 per month. The estimated impact of child SSI enrollment on the probability of any 
welfare receipt (not shown) is 8.4 percentage points or, as estimated in equation (3), 14.1 percentage 
points in the period more than eight months after enrollment. 
The next two columns report the results for estimation of the impact of SSI enrollment on the 
dollar value of in-kind assistance received through the Food Stamp Program (FSP) and Women, Infant, 
and Children (WIC) program. If the increase in SSI income exceeds any reduction in other income then 
the family’s dollar amount of food stamp transfers would potentially decline as well. The coefficient 
estimates are negative and increasingly so over time, but the long term decrease in food stamp plus WIC 
income (as captured by the POST_MONTHS_5-8+) is less than a tenth of the long term increase in SSI 
income. The final panel suggests that the net impact on total household unearned income, defined as total 
household income minus total household earnings, is an average increase of $1,650 per wave (standard 
error of 160), or $412 per month.  
B. Total Household Earnings and Income  
Having established that total unearned income increases by an average of roughly $400 per month 
after child SSI enrollment, we now investigate to what extent this is offset (or augmented) by a change in 
earnings and what the net change in total household earnings is. A large body of previous research has 
investigated the labor supply incentives of the AFDC and TANF programs. Only one paper of which we 
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are aware considers the effect of child enrollment in SSI on labor supply. Kubik (1999) uses CPS data to 
investigate whether the labor supply of single women with children and with some household SSI income 
is different from their observably similar counterparts with no household SSI benefits.29  He uses 
differences across states in the incentive to apply for SSI to instrument for program enrollment and his 
findings suggest that SSI reduced parental labor supply. But as mentioned above, the CPS does not 
differentiate between child and adult SSI receipt and the disincentive to work is much greater if the adult, 
rather than the child, is the SSI participant. Therefore, Kubik’s conclusion that child SSI receipt reduces 
labor supply could simply reflect the effect of adult SSI enrollment.30 
As described above, average earnings in households with a child on SSI are substantially greater 
than in households with welfare income. This could be a mechanical reflection of higher break-even 
levels for the SSI or reflect the fact that children on SSI are more likely to live with both parents. 
Alternatively, it might reflect the fact that the program’s rules do not discourage earnings as explicitly as 
the rules of pre-reform AFDC. It might also be the case that the labor supply decisions of parents with 
disabled children are more complicated than the traditional labor supply model posits. An increase in 
transfer income to these households might have a negative income effect; in particular, it might enable a 
parent to stay home to care for the child. On the other hand, it might allow a parent to buy specialized 
child care thereby “freeing up” their time for work outside the home. In other words, both the sign and the 
magnitude of the effect of child SSI enrollment on household earnings is theoretically ambiguous.  
The first six columns of Table 5 report the results of OLS estimation of equation [2] where Yjt is 
defined as an indicator for whether the household has positive earnings, the natural logarithm of 
household earnings, and the level of household earnings. The regression-adjusted estimates in the first 
                                                 
29 Neumark and Powers (2004) investigate the effect of SSI on the labor supply of near elderly individuals.  Once an 
individual reaches the age of 65, he/she can become eligible for the program even without a disability if income and 
assets are sufficiently low.  Their findings suggest that people strategically reduce their labor supply as they 
approach the age of 65 to qualify for benefits. 
30As Kubik (1999) notes, “it is not possible to separate the effects of net SSI benefit generosity on the probability of 
SSI receipt of children and parents using the variation created by the interaction of the AFDC and SSI benefit 
schedules.” According to our SIPP data, households with children and with some SSI income are actually more 
likely to have an adult rather than a child SSI recipient.  
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two columns suggest that child SSI enrollment has little impact on this extensive margin of labor supply.  
The statistically insignificant point estimate of .005 (standard error of .016) implies a 0.5 percentage point 
increase in this probability after a child enrolls in SSI.  The next two columns summarize the results from 
analogous specifications of the log of earnings, thereby dropping observations with earnings less than or 
equal to zero.  The statistically insignificant estimate for the POST SSI coefficient of -.023 in column (3) 
suggests a 2.3 percent decline in earnings among those working.  However, the pattern of coefficients in 
the estimation of equation [3] suggests that there is potentially a decline in the period of child SSI 
enrollment. The estimated coefficient on PRE_MONTHS_1-4 is 0.001 (standard error of 0.055) and the 
estimated coefficient on FIRST_SSI is –0.100 (standard error of 0.62). Though not statistically significant, 
this difference is pronounced. However, it does not persist over time, as shown by the positive estimate of 
.058 for the POST_MONTHS_5-8+ coefficient.  Estimates for the level of earnings are qualitatively 
similar, with a modest decline in the first wave of enrollment but some recovery in subsequent waves. 
The absence of a substantial reduction in earnings, coupled with the large increase in total transfer 
income, suggests a substantial increase in total household income. The regression-adjusted effects 
reported for total household income in the final two panels of Table 5 confirm this prediction. Columns 
(7) and (8) present the estimated effects for total household income in levels and columns (9) and (10) 
present the estimated effects for the dependent variable defined as the natural logarithm of total household 
income. The simple pre-post estimate suggests an increase of $1,265 (standard error of 350), which is 
more than 72 percent of the corresponding estimate for total SSI income. In the more descriptive 
equation, the estimated coefficient on PRE_MONTHS_1-4 is -106 (standard error of 478) and the 
estimated coefficient on FIRST_SSI is $1,455 (standard error of 502), suggesting a change in income of 
$1,561 per wave, or $390 per month corresponding to the wave of child enrollment in SSI. The estimated 
impact on total household income is higher in the next four months and is subsequently less.  
We next estimate equations [2] and [3] for the dependent variable defined as the log of total 
household income. This specification has two advantages: the effect of outliers on the OLS estimate is 
mitigated and changes can be interpreted as proportional changes. The results from this specification 
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demonstrate a statistically significant increase in household income of 21.9 percent (e0.198 – 1) following 
child enrollment in SSI. The pattern of coefficients estimated for equation [3] suggests little change in 
total income in the months preceding enrollment, but a statistically significant increase post child SSI 
enrollment in the range of 20 and 25 percent, with the impact decreasing slightly over time. 
C. Poverty 
We now turn our attention to the effect of child SSI enrollment on economic well-being as 
measured by poverty status.  The findings from the preceding two sections suggest that SSI benefits 
increase household income by an average of 72 cents on the dollar. Despite this, it is possible that the 
program does little to reduce poverty. First, if children awarded SSI benefits are not initially in poverty 
then they cannot be lifted out of it. On the other hand, if children awarded SSI live in households with 
very little income or if it offsets some other sources of income, then the increase in transfer income might 
not be sufficient to lift them out of poverty. 
In Table 6 we report the results for estimation of equations [2] and [3] for several different 
measures of poverty. The first three panels of results report estimated coefficients for Yjt defined as an 
indicator variable for whether household j’s total income in wave t is below the poverty threshold, below 
50 percent of the poverty threshold, and above 200 percent of the poverty threshold, respectively. The 
next panels in columns (7) and (8) define the dependent variable as the number of children in household j 
living below the poverty threshold. And finally, the last two panels in columns (9) through (12) report the 
results for Yjt  defined as the number of people in household j living below the poverty threshold and 
above 200 percent of the poverty threshold, respectively. The poverty threshold is the census poverty 
threshold of income in the year for a household and is provided in the SIPP given the number of adults 
and children. We adjust the threshold to correspond to recorded income in the SIPP, which is defined over 
a four-month period. We define the number of children and people in poverty as the number of children 
and people in the household multiplied by an indicator for whether total household income is below the 
relevant poverty threshold.  
The estimated effects reported in Table 6 demonstrate that child SSI participation does 
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substantially lower poverty.  Specifically, the regression-adjusted pre-post comparison reported in column 
(1) suggests that the probability that a household’s income is below the poverty line falls by 10.8 
percentage points (standard error of 1.8) following the child’s enrollment in SSI.  This effect is persistent, 
as the coefficient estimates from the more descriptive specification reveal. The likelihood that a 
household is in poverty two waves after child SSI enrollment is 10.4 percentage points lower than it is 
three waves prior to enrollment (standard error of 2.4). The next two columns explore whether the effect 
is driven by a reduction in deep poverty, defined as less than 50 percent of the poverty line. The estimates 
in columns (3) and (4) reveal that it is, with deep poverty falling by almost 7.6 percentage points 
(standard error of 1.7) following the first receipt of child SSI benefits. This effect also appears to be 
persistent. 
As mentioned above, many non-poor households are income-eligible for the SSI program.  It is 
therefore plausible that the program not only reduces poverty, but also increases the income of families 
further up in the income distribution.  The results reported in columns (5) and (6) provide support for this 
effect, with the probability that a household’s income is more than twice its reported poverty line 
increasing by 8.1 percentage points.  As was true for both poverty and deep poverty, this effect is 
persistent.  
In the next two columns we explore the effect of SSI enrollment on the number of children in 
poverty.  These specifications consider that many child SSI recipients have one or more siblings who are 
not on the program and hence the impact on the number of children might be greater than the impact on 
households. The estimated impacts reported in columns (7) and (8) suggest that the number of children 
lifted out of poverty is twice as large as the number of households. The effect is even greater for the 
number of people in poverty and the number of people with household incomes more than twice the 
poverty level.  According to the estimates presented in columns (9) and (11), for every 100 children who 
are awarded SSI benefits, roughly 37 people are lifted out of poverty and 28 see their household incomes 
increase to more than twice their poverty level.  Again, these effects appear to be persistent. 
D. Health Insurance Coverage 
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 When a child enrolls in the SSI program, he typically becomes eligible for health insurance 
through the Medicaid program.31 It might therefore be the case that child SSI enrollment increases health 
insurance coverage. Consider a child who was previously not covered by health insurance. When he 
enrolls in SSI, and hence Medicaid, there should be a one-for-one increase in both Medicaid and health 
insurance coverage.32 However, if a child who enrolls in SSI was already insured through Medicaid then 
we would see no impact on either Medicaid or on health insurance. Or, he might have previously been 
covered through private health insurance or through another government program, in which case his 
enrollment in Medicaid would have no effect on the probability of health insurance coverage. This latter 
example would provide a possible mechanism through which Medicaid enrollment could crowd out other 
health insurance coverage.33 
 Table 7 presents our estimates for the effect of child SSI enrollment on the number of children in 
the household with Medicaid34, with any health insurance, and with private health insurance.  Columns 1, 
4, and 7 report the results from estimating equation [2] on these three outcome variables.  The statistically 
significant point estimate of 0.099 in column 1 implies that for every 100 children awarded SSI benefits, 
approximately 10 become newly eligible for Medicaid benefits.  The fact that the point estimate is much 
less than one is not surprising when one considers that more than 60 percent of children in these 
households were on Medicaid in the wave before the first receipt of SSI benefits.  The corresponding 
estimate for the number of children with any health insurance is less than half as large and statistically 
insignificant.  Taking the ratio of the two point estimates, it appears that just 41 percent of those children 
                                                 
31 In forty out of fifty-one states, SSI recipients are automatically eligible for Medicaid.  Eleven states use more 
restrictive criteria when determining Medicaid eligibility (SSA, 2004). 
32 If that child has siblings who were eligible for Medicaid but not covered, his enrollment in SSI could potentially 
lead the family to learn of their Medicaid eligibility and enroll the other children in the household in Medicaid. In 
that case, we could observe an increase in Medicaid and health insurance coverage of greater than one-for-one. 
33 In the seminal paper on the topic, Cutler and Gruber (1996) evaluated the impact of the Medicaid program 
expansions of the late 1980s and early 1990s and estimated take-up rates among the newly eligible of 24 percent and 
crowd-out propensities of about 7 percent. Subsequent papers have found smaller rates of both take-up and crowd-
out. Shore-Sheppard (2005) revisits the Cutler and Gruber approach and finds crowd-out propensities of close to 
zero. It is worth noting that the take-up and crowd-out rates associated with child SSI participation need not be 
similar to those associated with the Medicaid expansions. 
34 If a child is enrolled in the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) then we code them as being covered by 
Medicaid. 
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made eligible for Medicaid were previously without health insurance. 
As previous work has noted, one possible effect of Medicaid enrollment is a reduction in private 
health insurance coverage (Cutler and Gruber, 1996).  The specification summarized in column (7) 
investigates this possibility by testing whether private insurance coverage declines following the first 
receipt of SSI benefits.  The point estimate of -.037 suggests that there may be some crowdout, though the 
estimate is not statistically significant. 
The summary statistics presented in Table 3 suggest that the effect of child SSI enrollment on 
health insurance coverage may differ in the latter part of our study period.  As the table shows, Medicaid 
enrollment is substantially lower and private insurance coverage is much higher among families with a 
child on SSI in early 2001 than in early 1996.  This may to some extent reflect the decline in TANF 
enrollment among households with a child on SSI (from 34.3 to 14.5 percent), which has reduced the 
number of children categorically eligible for Medicaid.  To investigate whether the effect is different in 
the latter part of our study period, we interact the POST_SSI indicator with two survey indicators.  The 
results for these specifications are summarized in columns 2, 5, and 8.  Interestingly while the estimated 
effect on Medicaid coverage is substantially greater for the 2001 sample, there is no corresponding 
difference for any health insurance coverage.  This is apparently because SSI enrollment has, according to 
the significantly negative estimate of -.145 in column 8, significantly reduced private health insurance 
coverage among children in the more recent part of our study period. 
 Columns (3), (6), and (9) of Table 7 explore the pattern of changes in health insurance coverage 
in the months leading up to and immediately following the first receipt of SSI benefits.  Consistent with 
the previous results, the estimated effect for Medicaid is much larger than for any health insurance 
coverage.  But the effect on Medicaid appears to be short-lived, as the point estimate for the 
POST_MONTHS_5-8+ coefficient is small and statistically insignificant.  Taken together, this set of 
results suggests that enrollment of a child on SSI has little effect on the health insurance coverage of 
children in affected households.  This is partially driven by the fact that more than 82 percent of children 
in these households already had health insurance from another source in the wave prior to enrollment. 
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VI. Robustness of Findings to Alternative Analysis Samples 
The results presented so far use all 20,949 households with children in the first wave of the 1996 
and 2001 versions of the SIPP to estimate the effect of child SSI enrollment.  We include all households 
rather than only those with a child on SSI to control for macroeconomic conditions and related factors 
that may lead to changes over time in earnings, poverty, and health insurance coverage that are unrelated 
to the SSI program.  One potential concern with this approach is that, even though our identification 
strategy primarily exploits within-household variation in SSI enrollment, our "control group" may be too 
broad.  Trends in earnings for very high income households or for households without any disabled 
children may, for example, be very different from those for children who apply for and/or eventually 
receive SSI benefits.  If this were true, it could bias our estimates. 
To gauge the potential importance of this issue, in Table 8 we summarize the results from 
additional specifications in which we use five alternative analysis samples.  The first column lists the 
estimates summarized above in Tables 4 through 7 for the POST_SSI indicator. In column (2) we present 
an analogous set of results for households that ever report receiving or applying for SSI benefits.35  This 
reduces the number of households in our sample from 20,949 to 2,715. The pattern of estimates is quite 
similar and suggests that SSI enrollment leads to a significant reduction in child poverty, a significant 
increase in Medicaid coverage, and has little effect on the extensive margin of household labor supply.  
The most notable difference in the estimates exists in the log(earnings) specification, with the results for 
the more narrowly defined sample suggesting that enrollment of a child on SSI reduces conditional 
earnings by approximately 11 percent.  This decline is not nearly sufficient, however, to offset the 
increase in unearned income, with total household income estimated to increase by more than 17 percent.  
The estimated effect for health insurance coverage is also marginally significant for this sample, though 
the point estimate is just half as large as the corresponding estimate for Medicaid coverage. 
In the specifications that are summarized in column (3), we include only those households that 
                                                 
35 In the first wave of the SIPP, individuals who are not receiving SSI are asked whether they have ever applied for 
SSI benefits.  This variable is unfortunately not asked in every wave. 
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report having an activity-limited child with a disability between the ages of 6 and 14.36  Because some of 
the children on SSI are outside of this age range and because some parents may not report their children's 
conditions, more than half of the households with a child on SSI are not in this sample.  As a result the 
standard errors increase in all specifications but the pattern of results is quite consistent with the previous 
ones.  In the next column we include all households either reporting a disability in their child or who have 
a child enrolled in SSI during our study period.  The estimates are quite similar to those in column three 
and suggest that enrollment of a child on SSI reduces poverty and increases Medicaid coverage but has 
little impact on either household earnings or the number of children without health insurance. 
 The specifications summarized in the final two columns include only those households that report 
having a child on SSI at some point during the survey, with column 5 including those enrolled in the first 
wave and column 6 excluding them.  The pattern of estimates is quite similar to the ones using alternative 
control groups in the previous four columns.  In all six specifications the estimate for poverty is 
significantly negative and the estimated effect on Medicaid coverage is significantly positive.  The 
estimated effect for the presence of any household earnings is small and precisely estimated, ranging from 
a low of -.006 to a high of .012.  It therefore appears that enrollment of a child on SSI does not lead to a 
significant change in labor force participation.  The estimates for conditional earnings are all negative and 
range from implying a 2 to a 13 percent decline. 
 Given the similarity of the estimates across the different sets of specifications, our initial set of 
findings appears to be robust.  The growth in SSI enrollment has substantially improved the material well-
being of families with disabled children while having very little impact on household earnings or health 
insurance coverage. 
VII. Discussion 
In this paper we have documented the growing importance of the federal SSI program as a source 
of cash assistance for low-income families with children. Our investigation of the impact of SSI on 
household outcomes suggests that this rise in child SSI participation may have played an important role in 
                                                 
36 This question is asked only during the fifth wave of the SIPP. 
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maintaining the material well-being of low-income families with children since the changes to the federal 
AFDC/TANF program that were implemented in 1996. Our analysis of household-level SIPP data finds 
that child SSI participation increases total household income by an average of approximately $316 per 
month, or 20 percent. This is accomplished by a substantial increase in transfer income that is only 
partially offset by a reduction in other transfer income and earnings. Put differently, for every 100 dollars 
in SSI income transferred to a family, total income increases by more than 72 dollars. Our findings 
suggest that enrollment of a child in the program has little impact on the extensive margin of labor supply, 
but the pattern of coefficients over time and across various samples suggests that there might be an offset 
of conditional earnings on the order of 5 to 10 percent. While we usually consider an offset of earnings to 
be a negative consequence of transfer programs, to the extent that parents are reducing their earnings to 
stay home and provide care for a disabled child, any offset of earnings might actually be considered in 
line with child SSI program goals.  
Furthermore, the data suggest that SSI participation is targeted at families such that there is a 
substantial decrease in poverty. Our analysis suggests that the probability that a household lives in 
poverty falls by 10.8 percentage points when a child enrolls in SSI and that this reduction in poverty is 
driven by a reduction in severe poverty, defined as having household income of less than 50 percent of 
the census poverty threshold. The data suggest that for every 100 children who enroll in SSI, 22 children 
and 37 people are lifted out of poverty and an additional 28 people see their incomes increase to more 
than twice the poverty line. These results suggest that the increase in child SSI enrollment over the past 
15 years has potentially played a large role in lowering child poverty rates.  Aggregating these effects to 
the national level, our findings suggest there are approximately 160,000 fewer children in poverty than 
there would have been absent the increase in child SSI enrollment since 1989.  
The data do not indicate a significant effect of SSI participation on health insurance coverage, 
though there is some evidence of a significant increase in the number of children receiving Medicaid. 
This set of findings has two important implications. First, though SSI participation entitles a child to 
Medicaid coverage, it does not appear to be an effective way to increase health insurance coverage among 
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low-income children. Second, the SIPP data indicate that the majority of children who enrolled in SSI 
were already receiving Medicaid. This suggests that the average cost of enrolling a child on SSI is much 
lower than the sum of cash benefits plus Medicaid expenditures would imply. Given that Medicaid 
expenditures for SSI recipients are substantially larger than cash benefits paid, this is an important fact.37 
There are two important limitations to this paper that deserve mention.  First, our empirical 
results shed light on the impact of child SSI enrollment for those families with children who are awarded 
benefits. To the extent that those whose applications are denied or those who do not apply for the program 
are different that the households who do enroll a child in the program, the results here will not generalize. 
That is, instead of representing the average treatment effect of child SSI receipt, our estimates capture the 
average effect on those who receive this treatment.  Similarly, it is important to note that the function of 
SSI as an anti-poverty program is limited to households with a child having a severe health impairment. 
Second, because the SIPP includes only three or four years of longitudinal data, our estimates will 
not capture the long run impact of child SSI receipt. Future work should investigate the long-run effects 
of the program, in particular because the average duration on SSI is longer than on traditional welfare.  
Future work should also investigate additional measures of family well-being, including how families use 
the additional income that they receive from the SSI program.  Recent work has explored the effect of 
changes in income resulting from welfare reform and changes in tax policy on measures of well-being 
such as consumption and educational attainment (Meyer and Sullivan, 2004; Dahl and Lochner, 2005). 
There has been very little work of this type for SSI despite the growing importance of this program. 
Current trends suggest that the significance of the SSI program for disadvantaged children will 
continue to grow while the receipt of TANF benefits declines, with the number of children on TANF 
falling by 13.1percent from 2000 to 2004 while SSI receipt among children increased by 17.3 percent 
during the same period.  Thus more work to understand the effects of the Supplemental Security Income 
program and its interaction with other government programs is clearly warranted. 
                                                 
 37 Total Medicaid spending for SSI recipients was greater than $150 billion in 2003.  Thus average Medicaid 
spending for individuals on SSI is approximately four times greater than average cash benefits.  
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Figure 1: Percentage of Children Ages 0-17 Enrolled in SSI: 1985-2005
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Figure 2: Percentage of Children Applying for or Awarded SSI 1985-2004
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Household-level Variables 1990 1993 1996 2001 2004
% Households with Any SSI 2.5% 3.4% 4.4% 4.4% 5.4%
% Households with any AFDC / TANF 8.6% 11.2% 9.2% 3.9% 4.1%
% Children with any SSI 2.8% 4.3% 5.1% 4.7% 6.0%
% Children with Any AFDC / TANF 10.3% 14.0% 11.4% 4.8% 4.9%
Avg SSI Benefit | Any SSI = 1 $1,939 $2,085 $2,268 $2,273 $2,342
Avg AFDC / TANF Ben | Any A/T = 1 $2,127 $1,978 $1,680 $1,249 $1,178
Ratio of SSI to AFDC / TANF dollars 0.23 0.33 0.66 2.06 2.60
# Households with Children < 18 8523 7530 13918 12913 15541
Table 1: SIPP Data on Receipt of SSI and AFDC/TANF in Households with Children: 1990-2004
Data includes information from the first wave of the Survey of Income and Program Participation in each 
year for households with one or more children under the age of 17.   All expenditure amounts are inflation-
adjusted to 2003 dollars using the CPI-U.  Statistics are calculated using either the household or person 
weights in each year.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Child SSI Adult SSI AFDC / TANF
Number of Children 0-17 1.92 0.0042*** 0.0015 0.0102***
(1.02) (.0007) (.0010) (.0013)
Number of Boys 0-17 0.98 0.0013* -0.0006 0.0003
(0.87) (.0007) (.0010) (.0014)
Mom Only Present 0.239 0.0080*** 0.0093*** 0.0799***
(.422) (.0015) (.0018) (.0058)
Dad Only Present 0.034 0.0054* 0.0102*** 0.0273***
(.177) (.0030) (.0028) (.0046)
Neither Mom nor Dad Present 0.038 0.0072*** 0.0253*** 0.0641***
(.179) (.0023) (.0033) (.0064)
Less than High School Graduate 0.102 0.0095*** 0.0222*** 0.0462***
(.302) (.0019) (.0034) (.0048)
Some College 0.319 -0.0036*** -0.0104*** -0.0159***
(.466) (.0009) (.0015) (.0024)
College Graduate 0.289 -0.0088*** -0.0160*** -0.0457***
(.453) (.0014) (.0013) (.0039)
AFDC / TANF Ben in hundreds of $ 5.172 -0014*** -.0006 .0050***
(2.328) (.0004) (.0009) (.0009)
State SSI Supplement for Kids 0.368 0.0035*** 0.0040
(.482) (.0014) (.0068)
State SSI Supplement for Adults 0.453 0.0073***
(.498) (.0029)
Black 0.156 0.0075*** 0.0159*** 0.0288***
(.362) (.0009) (.0024) (.0034)
Hispanic 0.122 -0.0012 0.0005 0.0050
(.326) (.0020) (.0038) (.0068)
Year = 1993 0.241 0.0019 0.0019 0.0028
(.427) (.0016) (.0028) (.0030)
Year = 1996 0.245 0.0060*** 0.0103*** 0.0011
(.429) -0.0021 (.0027) (.0039)
Year = 2001 0.251 0.0052*** 0.0111*** -0.0270***
(.433) (.0021) (.0035) (.0034)
Sample size 42,170 41,355 41,355 41,355
Mean of Dep Var - 0.0156 0.0258 0.0849
Pseudo R-squared - 0.1141 0.0985 0.3167
Table 2: Determinants of SSI & AFDC / TANF Receipt among Families with Children
Sample consists of all 42,170 households from wave one of the 1992, 1993, 1996, and 2001 versions of 
the SIPP with one or more children under the age of 18.   Column (1) reports the mean and standard 
deviation for each of the explanatory variables.  Columns (2), (3), and (4) report the coefficient estimates 
from a probit specification characterizing the probability of receipt of child SSI, adult SSI, and 
AFDC/TANF benefits, respectively. The numbers reported represent marginal effects. Standard errors 
adjusted for clustering by state are included in parentheses.  All specifications are weighted by the 
household weight in wave one of the SIPP.   Approximately 2 percent of observations are not included in 
the specifications because the state of residence variable is missing.
SSI Child SSI Adult AFDC SSI Child SSI Adult TANF
# Households 299 458 1453 252 435 546
Weighted % of Households 1.9% 2.9% 9.2% 1.8% 3.1% 3.9%
Avg # Kids 0-17 2.58 2.06 2.38 2.25 1.97 2.40
Avg # Adults 18-64 1.77 2.33 1.75 1.85 2.33 1.71
Avg # Adults 65+ 0.07 0.28 0.05 0.07 0.22 0.07
% with Both Parents 37.1% 42.5% 22.3% 34.8% 38.6% 20.1%
% with Mom Only 50.7% 38.1% 66.0% 48.8% 42.1% 65.2%
% with Dad Only 2.1% 6.0% 2.1% 5.2% 2.5% 2.6%
% with Neither 10.1% 13.4% 9.5% 11.2% 16.8% 12.1%
Avg H-Hold Earnings $4,735 $6,821 $3,707 $6,266 $7,419 $3,364
Avg Total H-Hold Income $9,072 $11,508 $6,611 $10,654 $12,023 $5,938
% with Any SSI Kid 100.0% 14.3% 7.0% 100.0% 17.3% 6.9%
% with Any SSI Adult 22.3% 100.0% 10.7% 29.5% 100.0% 17.3%
% with Any AFDC/TANF 34.3% 33.6% 100.0% 14.5% 21.4% 100.0%
% with Any Food Stamp 47.1% 52.1% 88.4% 31.0% 45.3% 82.4%
Avg SSI Income $2,689 $2,365 $384 $2,735 $2,438 $540
Avg AFDC / TANF Income $526 $499 $1,680 $141 $237 $1,249
Avg Food Stamp Income $444 $477 $1,017 $241 $342 $804
Avg Social Security - Adult $399 $864 $245 $473 $801 $287
Avg Social Security - Kid $187 $180 $67 $249 $158 $64
All Other Income $536 $779 $528 $790 $970 $434
Poverty Ratio 0-49% 6.0% 8.2% 33.9% 7.1% 9.1% 34.0%
Poverty Ratio 50-99% 34.4% 32.6% 34.3% 21.5% 27.5% 34.1%
% Kids with Medicaid 87.1% 62.9% 87.8% 68.6% 64.1% 84.8%
% Kids with Private Health Ins 22.4% 27.9% 13.4% 35.7% 35.7% 21.3%
% Kids with any Health Ins 94.2% 83.6% 93.0% 86.6% 84.4% 89.7%
Table 3: Households with Children and with AFDC/TANF, SSI Child, and/or SSI Adult Benefits
1996 SIPP Wave 1 2001 SIPP Wave 1
Table summarizes information for households with one or more children under the age of 18 in the 
first wave of the 1996 and 2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation and with income from 
either the SSI or AFDC/TANF programs.  SSI Child and SSI Adult columns summarize information for 
households with one or more children (0-17) and with one or more adults (18+), respectively, 
receiving SSI benefits.  The AFDC and TANF columns summarize information for households with 
some AFDC or TANF income in 1996 or 2001.  Dollar figures are adjusted to 2003 dollars using the 
CPI-U.   Household data is weighted using the SIPP household weights to account for non-random 
sampling.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
POST SSI 1747*** -134*** -.084*** -81*** -.025 1650***
(91) (47) (.019) (28) (.021) (162)
PRE MONTHS 5-8 175** -54 -0.018 6 0.047* 196
(73) (34) (.020) (36) (.025) (210)
PRE MONTHS 1-4 226*** -112** -0.048** -22 .059** 580***
(64) (52) (.023) (38) (.029) (201)
2314*** -112** -.056** -59 0.038 2334***
(116) (52) (.023) (39) (.029) (231)
POST MONTHS 1-4 2096*** -117* -.064** -81** 0.019 2135***
(122) (70) (.025) (39) (.030) (233)
POST MONTHS 5-8+ 1556*** -241*** -.141*** -102*** -.016 1582***
(107) (73) (.025) (38) (.030) (226)
R-Squared 0.707 0.713 0.696 0.696 0.673 0.673 0.716 0.716 0.718 0.718 0.642 0.635
Mean, Std. Dev.
Any Food Stamps 
or WIC
Total Unearned 
Income
115, 626 1669, 3277
Total Household SSI
Total Food Stamps 
plus WIC
Table 4: The Impact of Child SSI Enrollment on Household Transfer Income
83, 416 .054, .227 134, 409 .173, .379
Total Welfare 
Income Any Welfare Income
FIRST WAVE WITH 
CHILD SSI
Sample consists of all 20949 households from the 1996 and 2001 versions of the SIPP with one or more children between the ages of 0 and 14 in wave one 
and who are still present in wave two.  Unit of observation is a household-wave and there are 195871 observations in all cases.  All specifications include 
20949 household and 21 wave*year fixed effects.  The explanatory variable POST SSI is equal to one in the first wave that the child is eligible for SSI and in 
all subsequent waves and is zero otherwise.  The even-numbered columns have indicators for the wave of the first SSI enrollment along with two pre and post 
variables.  The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 equals one if there is a child receiving SSI in that wave in the household and zero otherwise.  The 
variable in the next two columns is defined similarly except it is equal to one if there is any SSI recipient.  The last explanatory variable is (inflation-adjusted) 
SSI income for the household in the wave.  Standard errors are clustered by household and included in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
POST SSI 0.005 -0.023 -385 1265*** .198***
(.016) (.043) (322) (350) (.029)
PRE MONTHS 5-8 -0.020 0.044 -487 -291 0.026
(.020) (.052) (479) (534) (.038)
PRE MONTHS 1-4 -0.032 0.001 -686 -106 -0.013
(.022) (.055) (418) (478) (.044)
-0.026 -0.100 -879* 1455** .222***
(.023) (.062) (451) (502) (.039)
POST MONTHS 1-4 -0.002 -0.084 -419 1716** 0.219***
(.023) (.066) (529) (577) (.040)
POST MONTHS 5-8+ -0.004 0.058 -740 842* 0.181***
(.022) (.058) (457) (499) (.038)
R-Squared 0.612 0.612 0.736 0.736 0.725 0.725 0.721 0.699 0.696 0.696
Sample size 195,871 195,871 182,289 182,289 195,871 195,871 195871 195871 194,979 194,979
Mean, Std. Dev.
Table 5: The Impact of Child SSI Enrollment on Earnings and Household Income
Household EarningsAny Earnings
Total Household 
IncomeLog(Earnings)
20977, 19426
Log(Total Household 
Income)
9.633, .88519307, 19259.937, .244 9.596, .908
FIRST WAVE WITH 
CHILD SSI
Sample consists of all 20949 households from the 1996 and 2001 versions of the SIPP with a child between the ages of 0 and 14 in the 
first wave of the survey and who are still present in wave two.  Unit of observation is a household-wave and the number of observations 
is listed for each specification.  This is sometimes less than 195871 if the dependent variable is a log measure because values less than 
or equal to zero will be missing.  All specifications include 20949 household and 21 wave*year fixed effects.  The variable POST SSI is 
equal to one in the first wave that the child is eligible for SSI and in all subsequent waves and is zero otherwise.  The even-numbered 
columns have indicators for the wave of the first SSI enrollment along with two pre and post variables.  The dependent variables are total 
household earnings (specifications 1 and 2), an indicator for any household earnings (3 and 4), the log of household earnings (5 and 6), 
total household income (7 and 8), and the log of total household income (9 and 10).  Standard errors are clustered by household and 
i l d d i h
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
POST SSI -0.108*** -.076*** 0.081*** -.216*** -0.374*** .284***
(.018) (.017) (.017) (.056) (.086) (.074)
PRE MONTHS 5-8 -0.016 -0.013 0.001 0.004 -0.048 0.057
(.026) (.021) (.026) (.075) (.123) (.114)
PRE MONTHS 1-4 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.049 0.050 0.052
(.026) (.023) (.025) (.080) (.126) (.122)
-.119*** -.102*** .066*** -.208*** -0.410*** 0.225**
(.025) (.021) (.025) (.074) (.116) (.115)
POST MONTHS 1-4 -.109*** -.076*** .079*** -.186** -.370*** .301***
(.026) (.021) (.025) (.086) (.130) (.114)
POST MONTHS 5-8+ -.104*** -.067*** .090*** -.197** -.344*** .363***
(.024) (.021) (.024) (.080) (.123) (.109)
R-Squared 0.592 0.592 0.477 0.477 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.607 0.607 0.670 0.670
Mean, Std. Dev. .628, .483
Number of People in 
Poverty
.633, 1.626
Number of People > 
200% of Poverty
2.452, 2.122
In Poverty < 50% of Poverty > 200% of Poverty
Table 6: The Impact of Child SSI Enrollment on Poverty
.142, .349 .056, .230
Number of Children in 
Poverty
FIRST WAVE WITH 
CHILD SSI
.340, .975
Sample consists of all 20949 households from the 1996 and 2001 versions of the SIPP with a child between the ages of 0 and 14 in the first wave of the SIPP and 
who are still present in wave two.  Unit of observation is a household-wave and there are 195871 observations in all cases.  All specifications include 20949 
household and 21 wave*year fixed effects.  The explanatory variable in the odd-numbered columns is equal to one in the first wave that the child is eligible for SSI 
and in all subsequent waves and is zero otherwise.  The even-numbered columns have indicators for the wave of the first SSI enrollment along with two pre and post 
variables.  The dependent variables are an indicator for whether the household is below the poverty line in the wave (specifications 1 and 2), an indicator for being 
less than 50 percent of the poverty line (3 and 4), the number of children in poverty (5 and 6), the number of children less than 50 percent of poverty (7 and 8), and 
the number of people less than 50 percent of poverty in the household (9 and 10).  Standard errors are clustered by household and included in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
POST SSI 0.099* 0.040 -0.026
(.058) (.047) (.049)
POST SSI * 1996 SAMPLE 0.036 0.045 0.058
(.081) (.068) (.060)
POST SSI * 2001 SAMPLE .189** 0.033 -.145*
(.082) (.061) (.083)
PRE MONTHS 5-8 -0.018 -0.029 -0.039
(.067) (.068) (.061)
PRE MONTHS 1-4 0.049 -0.002 -0.057
(.078) (.066) (.071)
.284*** 0.104 -0.069
(.076) (.066) (.068)
POST MONTHS 1-4 .214** 0.057 -0.081
(.085) (.072) (.070)
POST MONTHS 5-8+ -0.015 -0.012 -0.035
(.079) (.066) (.068)
R-Squared 0.739 0.739 0.740 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.773 0.773 0.773
Mean, Std. Dev.
Number of Children with Priv HI
1.359, 1.152
Table 7: The Impact of Child SSI Enrollment on Health Insurance Coverage
Number of Children on Medicaid Number of Children with Health Ins
0.420, 1.000 1.706, 1.151
FIRST WAVE WITH CHILD 
SSI
Sample consists of all 20949 households from the 1996 and 2001 versions of the SIPP with a child between the ages of 0 and 14 in the first wave of the 
SIPP and who are still present in wave two.  Unit of observation is a household-wave and there are 195871 observations in all cases.  All specifications 
include 20949 household and 21 wave*year fixed effects.  The explanatory variable for the specification summarized in columns 1, 4, and 7 is equal to 
one in the first wave that the child is eligible for SSI and in all subsequent waves and is zero otherwise.  In specifications 2, 5, and 8, this variable is 
interacted with two dummy variables reflecting each of the survey years.  Specifications 3, 6, and 9 have indicators for the wave of the first SSI enrollment 
along with two pre and post variables.  The dependent variables are the average number of children ages 0-17 on Medicaid in the wave (specifications 1 -
3), the average number of children with health insurance (4-6), and the average number of children reporting that they have private health insurance.  
Standard errors are clustered by household and included in parentheses.
Child SSI
All H-holds Ever Apply or Disabled or Disabled Child SSI
w/Children Receive SSI Child 6-14? Child 6-14? Child SSI Switchers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Household Earnings -385 -473 -340 -215 19 114
(322) (339) (659) (359) (367) (423)
(2) Any Earnings 0.005 -0.006 0.010 0.005 -0.002 0.012
(.016) (.016) (.031) (.016) (.017) (.020)
(3) Log(Household Earnings) -0.023 -.116** -0.049 -0.045 -.130*** -0.090
(.043) (.045) (.086) (.044) (.050) (.058)
(4) Total Household Income 1265*** 1131*** 1573** 1495*** 2012*** 1965***
(350) (369) (721) (386) (409) (468)
(5) Log(Total Household Income) .198*** .169*** .221*** .205*** .232*** .227***
(.029) (.030) (.048) (.030) (.033) (.038)
(6) Household in Poverty -0.108*** -.085*** -.117*** -.109*** -.117*** -.119***
(.018) (.018) (.035) (.018) (.020) (.023)
(7) Household < 50% of Poverty -.076*** -.068*** -.097*** -.083*** -.102*** -.100***
(.017) (.017) (.032) (.017) (.018) (.020)
(8) Household > 200% of Poverty .081*** .053*** .087*** .076*** .068*** .067***
(.017) (.018) (.033) (.018) (.020) (.023)
(9) # of Children in Poverty -.216*** -.158*** -.290*** -.221*** -.229*** -.244***
(.056) (.057) (.112) (.056) (.060) (.067)
(10) # of People in Poverty -.374*** -.270*** -.375** -.375*** -.401*** -.430***
(.086) (.089) (.088) (.088) (.093) (.104)
(11) # of People > 200% of Poverty .284*** .146** .286* .233*** .191** .232**
(.074) (.075) (.157) (.076) (.084) (.099)
(12) # of Children with Medicaid .099* .143*** 0.206 .115** 0.253*** 0.157***
(.058) (.057) (.141) (.058) (.062) (.071)
(13) # of Children with Health Insurance 0.040 .078* 0.114 0.057 0.114** 0.077
(.047) (.048) (.112) (.048) (.051) (.061)
(14) # of Children with Private HI -0.026 -0.006 0.039 0.020 0.017 0.052
(.049) (.049) (.115) (.049) (.052) (.063)
# of Households 20949 2715 1727 2215 753 375
# of Observations 195871 26005 17431 22105 7388 3790
Table 8: Sensitivity of Results to Alternative Control Groups
Table provides point estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) for the coefficient on POST SSI from specifications 
analogous to those in the odd-numbered columns of Tables 4-7.  Each coefficient estimate reported in the table is from a 
different specification.  Unit of observation in each specification is the household-wave.  All specifications include household 
and wave fixed effects and are weighted using the SIPP household weights in each wave.
